Commensurability This is the center line position that makes the rest of Modal Path Ethics work. The corpus has been operating in it across every article.
Formal: What Makes Something a Locus Why not everything with a name can be harmed. Modal Path Ethics defines harm as contraction of weighted reachable future-space in extance. That definition immediately raises a further question: What bears the contraction? If the answer is “persons,” then the framework collapses back into the person-centered ethics it was built
Formal: Weighted Reachable Future Space Why is moral weight structural, not subjective? The objection here is not that Modal Path Ethics lacks a definition of harm. The objection is that the definition used appears to require a second operation which has not yet been defended. If harm is contraction of reachable future-space in extance, then
Solving the Parfit Puzzle Suite When Derek Parfit died in 2017, his obituaries placed him among the most important moral philosophers of the late twentieth century, which was probably about right, if a bit conservative. What he left us was a body of puzzles designed to break the moral frameworks we had inherited. Most of
Formal: Contraction Is Harm Why can harm occur before persons exist? The likely objection is obvious enough to state: Contraction may describe a structural change. Why should anyone call it harm? If Modal Path Ethics cannot answer this, then the framework has only actually renamed loss in modal language. It would be describing a